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Abstract
This paper is a study of the inﬂuence of economic and political condi-
tions on the results of incumbent parties’ candidates in local elections in
France. The large sample used covers 586 towns and two elections (2001
and 2008). It explicitly deals with the speciﬁcities induced by the two-
round process of the French electoral rule, and results are provided for
both the reelection probability and the share of votes. It is shown that
the budget structure, and notably equipment expenditures, has a strong
impact on the incumbent party’s share of votes. Political variables also
play a role, as do the number of candidates, and national partisan waves.
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11 Introduction
In the last decades, since Downs’ (1957) seminal work and the classical studies
by Key (1966), Kramer (1971) and Frey and Schneider (1978), the signiﬁcant im-
pact of economic conditions on voting behavior has been repeatedly conﬁrmed.
Strikingly, it has also been shown that voters hold relatively “na¨ ıve” views of the
economy, as voters hold incumbent politicians accountable for past and current
(but not prospective) economic outcomes. Such behavior was given theoretical
foundations in Rogoﬀ and Sibert (1988) in a competency model with rational
expectations where political parties also diﬀer by their ability to deliver good
economic outcomes to the population. As ability cannot be directly observed,
past and present outcomes ﬁnd their way into the electorate’s evaluations and
votes. A similar result can be derived from Alesina and Cukierman’s (1990)
model, where voters are not informed about parties’ preferences and have to
guess future policies from current developments. Harrington (1993) elaborates
on both models to build a synthetic one, with the conclusion unchanged about
voters’ behavior, relying on past and current data.
While ﬁrst developed to analyze presidential elections in bipolar political
environments (and thus for the United States), the literature has since devoted
attention to lower level elections, allowing the small sample problem of presi-
dential runs to be overcome. Moreover, the growing literature on sub-national
elections also reveals that politicians can inﬂuence voters with the instruments
they can use at this level, particularly the repartition of budgets between invest-
ment and operating expenditures, and the number of public employees they can
hire. Veiga and Veiga (2007), for Portugal, show that increases in investment
expenditures and changes in the composition of spending favoring highly visible
items are associated with higher vote percentages for incumbent mayors seeking
reelection. Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008), for Brazil, analyze the inﬂuence
of public expenditures on the probability of mayors’ reelection, and show that
mayors who spend more during their terms of oﬃce increase the probability of
their own reelection or of a successor of the same political party. For France,
Dubois and Paty (2009), testing the yardstick competition hypothesis at the
municipal level, show that voters sanction their incumbent if their own local
housing tax is high compared to their close geographical neighbors.
Our aim in this paper is to build on this emerging literature to check the
inﬂuence of the local budget structure on incumbents’ results and reelection
prospects. To do so, we look at the French local (municipal) elections of 2001 and
2008. The French case is interesting in itself given its speciﬁc legal framework
and the (induced) multiparty political arena. Also, as the institutional structure
is the same across the sample, with ﬁxed election dates being called exogenously
(from the perspective of the local politician), an endogenous bias is removed.
Other than the new database we use, the paper brings two contributions
to the literature. First, the empirical methodology we build permits the iden-
tiﬁcation of speciﬁc determinants for the ﬁrst and the second rounds of the
2electoral process. In the ﬁrst round, the incumbent faces three possibilities (re-
election, defeat or standing again in the second ballot) while, if the incumbent
has to stand again at the second ballot, there are two possibilities for him (like
in existing studies focusing on one-stage elections): reelection or defeat. The
second feature, and additional contribution of the paper is that we proceed in
two steps. The ﬁrst step considers the probability of being reelected, while the
second focuses on the number of votes of the incumbents. The determinants of
the share of votes a candidate receives may, naturally, be diﬀerent from the ones
that explain the probability of being reelected. To our knowledge, the potential
diﬀerences between the two are rarely acknowledged, if at all, in the literature.
Moreover, to escape from the inﬂuence of spin-doctors and individual charisma,
we build our database not from individual politicians’ results, but from their
political parties’ results. Partisan endorsements are the variable of interest here.
The logic behind this choice is that it allows for investigation of the crossed in-
ﬂuence of partisanship, incumbency, and economic performance (here assessed
notably from the expenditures side) on the election results, without noise from
individual characteristics. The durable attachment of most voters to one or
another political party has been noted since at least Campbell et al. (1960),
and empirically and theoretically conﬁrmed ever since (see, e.g. Degan and
Merlo, 2009). Here, given the French political and legal systems, we have an
opportunity to test the inﬂuence of endorsements by political parties on voters’
behavior. Such an enrichment of the analysis had been called for, for example,
by Bartels and Brady (2003).
We ﬁrst show that municipal budget structure has an impact on both the
result of the incumbent’s party and the probability of reelection but only in the
ﬁrst round. More precisely, operating expenditures, apart from staﬀ costs have
a signiﬁcant negative impact on the ﬁrst round, both on the incumbent’s result
and on her probability of being reelected in the ﬁrst round (compared to the
“stand again” case). Equipment spending plays a positive role on the incumbent
party’s share of votes but has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of being
reelected in the ﬁrst round. As for political variables, an interesting result
is that the number of competing candidates in the ﬁrst round both reduces
the probability of the incumbent being reelected in the ﬁrst round and her
probability of being defeated in the ﬁrst round. Also, and more speciﬁcally, a
positive impact of mergers in the second round is only observed for the 2001
election. More strikingly, the fact that the incumbent and the majority in
Parliament belong to the same party tends to reduce the incumbent’s share of
vote and her probability of being reelected. Finally, it has to be noted that local
economic (gap to the average) variables only come into play in voters’ minds in
the ﬁrst round of the 2008 election.
The following section details the background literature, while Section 3 spec-
iﬁes the legal and political contexts of the study. Section 4 presents the data
and the econometric methodology, while empirical results are commented on
3Section 5. The conclusion gives a summary and delivers some hints for further
research.
2 Background literature
Former papers studying local interactions between politics and economics gen-
erally consider the political business cycle of municipal economics, omitting the
voters’ reactions. Thus, the estimation of vote functions including politically
strategic determinants and/or economical variables is a relatively recent issue
at the local level. A ﬁrst strand of the literature deals with the composition of
public budgets, while another focuses on the eﬀect of local tax rates and tests
the yardstick competition hypothesis.
Regarding local jurisdictions, Silva and Silva Costa (2006) establish the levels
of performance of Portuguese incumbents through the construction of an empiri-
cal frontier using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology and then
introduce these levels in the vote function. However, the eﬃciency of local gov-
ernments does not appear as an important factor in explaining the vote shares
whereas ideology has some inﬂuence on the voters’ decisions. In turn, Cerda and
Vergara (2007) use a panel of Chilean municipalities to conclude that the na-
tional rate of unemployment decreases the incumbent’s share of votes. Brender
(2003) notably stands closer to our point, examining the reelection of mayors
in Israeli cities. When voters are able to eﬀectively monitor the ﬁscal choices of
local oﬃcials, any build up of large pre-election deﬁcits harms an incumbent’s
chances of being reelected. Not only do voters in Israel penalize election year
deﬁcits, but they also reward high expenditure in development projects in the
year preceding an election. In a study evaluating local Russian governmental en-
tities, Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) ﬁnd that pre-electoral manipulation
of ﬁscal instruments increases the incumbent’s chances of being reelected. Using
data from Portuguese municipalities, Veiga and Veiga (2007) ﬁnd that increases
in investment expenditures and changes in the composition of spending favoring
highly visible items are associated with higher vote percentages for incumbent
mayors seeking re-election. Drazen and Eslava (2009) analyze Colombian may-
oral elections by considering a panel of Colombian cities during the 1992–2000
period. Similarly to Peltzman (1992) and Brender (2003), their results indicate
that the share of votes received by the incumbent’s party is decreasing in the
level of the deﬁcit in the year preceding the election. It appears therefore that
well informed voters are not only hard to “buy” through spending increases, but
are also averse to high overall government spending and deﬁcits. Sakurai and
Menezes-Filho (2008), for Brazil, analyze the inﬂuence of public expenditures
on the probability of mayors being reelected, and show that mayors who spend
more during their terms of oﬃce increase the probability of their own reelection
or of a successor of the same political party.
Vote functions have been studied by the yardstick competition literature
that assumes that voters are sensitive to neighbors’ choices. In this case, if all
4her neighbors lower their tax rates in the election year it is desirable for the
incumbent to lower her own tax rate in order to be reelected. Tests of this
hypothesis generally rely on the estimation of tax reaction functions. In their
pioneer work, Besley and Case (1995) mainly explain the probability of incum-
bent defeat in the US States from 1960 to 1988 by “own tax change” (coming
with a positive sign) and “neighbors’ tax change” (coming with a negative sign).
Using a classical vote function instead of the probability of defeat, Bordignon
et al. (2002) reject the yardstick competition hypothesis for Italy. The equa-
tion was estimated on a cross-sectional sample of 97 Municipal elections held
in Lombardia between 1998 and 2000, where levels and changes in neighbors’
business property tax rates were found to be insigniﬁcant. In another study,
Revelli (2002) attempts to test a possible yardstick competition eﬀect in 122
English districts on the period 1979-1987. His results conﬁrmed the yardstick
competition hypothesis with a negative eﬀect of own property tax increases and
a positive eﬀect of neighbors’ property tax increases on the incumbent’s vote
share. Veirmer and Heyndels (2006) investigated yardstick voting in Flemish
Municipal elections during the period 1982-2000. They found that higher rates
of local income tax and property tax in neighboring municipalities were favor-
able to the incumbents. Bosch and Sol´ e-Oll´ e (2007) conﬁrmed that property tax
increases in Spanish municipalities, both at municipal and neighborhood levels,
have the expected impact on the incumbent’s share of the vote in three local
elections (1995, 1999 and 2003). Finally, estimating a fully speciﬁed vote func-
tion on a panel data set of 104 French municipalities (including both political
and economic determinants at both national and local levels), Dubois and Paty
(2009) show that voters sanction the incumbent if their own local housing tax
is high compared to their close geographical neighbors.
To our knowledge, none of the vote function papers on French mayoral elec-
tions include budgetary variables. In studies relying on other countries including
disaggregated local expenditures, the political ground is quite limited. Moreover,
the speciﬁc setting of some municipal elections, which take the form of two-stage
processes is never clearly taken into account. We here complement the literature
on both accounts.
3 Legal and political environment
Compared to the existing studies in the ﬁeld, both the legal and political con-
texts of French local elections are very diﬀerent. First, the French political arena
is not a bi-partisan one. In the chosen sample (see below), a lot of diﬀerent par-
ties exist (and cannot be considered as marginal). For each election we consider,
voters are given the choice among more than ten parties. Simply diﬀerentiat-
ing the Right from the Left would thus clearly not be relevant, as this would
have combined, for example, in 2001, the National Front (FN, far-right party,
leader: Jean-Marie Le Pen) with the Rally for the Republic (RPR, moderate
right, leader: Jacques Chirac). We do not believe this situation to be as prob-
5lematic as it may ﬁrst seem. If anything, it may lead to a slight over-estimation
in our results, as a statistical artifact: an incumbent will typically face several
opponents, and thus will ceteris paribus have a higher ex-ante probability of
victory, simply because the opposing electorate will divide its vote over several
candidates.
The legal context for local elections has historically evolved several times, but
has remained ﬁxed since 1982 (and applied since 1983). Elections normally take
place every six years1. A 3,500-inhabitant threshold is ﬁxed, the voting system
being diﬀerent for smaller towns. As our sample is composed only of towns
with population numbers above the threshold (see below), we only describe the
relevant system: the poll competition is organized by lists, with two rounds
(possibly) taking place. The winning list receives half the seats to be ﬁlled in
the town council, the other half of the seats being distributed proportionally
between all the lists (including the winning list) that have received more than
5% of the votes. If a second round is necessary, all the lists with more than
10% of the votes can compete but the lists with more than 5% of the votes
can merge between the two rounds. As a consequence of the multi-partisan
context, the electoral law oﬀers the possibility to the lists defeated in the ﬁrst
round to merge with one (or several) of the runners-up in the second round of
the election. Even if the electorate may disapprove of the merger, it may prove
important for winning the second round of the election. On practical as well as
on academic grounds, this possibility of a merger is not without consequences,
and we will have to speciﬁcally include this potential eﬀect in our study.
Hence, to our knowledge, this study is the ﬁrst at the local level to provide a
full view of the two-stage election process, to explicitly account for the possibility
to merge lists, and to simultaneously account for the number of candidates.
4 Data
As for the geographical coverage, a trade-oﬀ had to be faced. Considering towns
that are too small in size would have let strong personal links, between the elec-
torate and the incumbent mayor, play an important (and troubling, not to say
spurious) role, but we also wanted to have a good representation of the French
population. We thus selected a threshold of 10,000 inhabitants. Due to the
fact that in some rural departments, the biggest cities are under the threshold,
we include the biggest cities of the department. So all departments are repre-
sented, excluding overseas territories. This gives us coverage of 586 cities, or
about half the French population, which is almost certainly something that we
can safely consider as representative. Moreover, this threshold also ensures that
the institutional (political and legal) context is consistent through the sample.
At the city level, spending data is available over the period 2000-2007, so we
1Except between 2001 and 2008, the election being postponed to avoid electoral fatigue in
2007, a year in which both the Presidential and Assembly elections were taking place.
6cover for the elections of 2001 and 2008. The time-period is suﬃciently short
to comfortably assume a constant electoral behavior and, to our knowledge, our
geographic and demographic coverage is larger than in the existing literature on
French vote functions.
Three kinds of information are collected, the ﬁrst being political data for
each town and each election available from the ministry of internal aﬀairs.
4.1 Political variables
The observed variable we want to explain is the electoral result of the incumbent
mayor’s party. The latter can be understood either as the incumbent’s party’s
share of votes, called INC or the probability of being reelected, or Prob(INC).
This means that if the incumbent mayor does not run for the following election,
we consider the candidate of the same party as the incumbent. This is clearly
designed to capture partisan eﬀects, as we want to explain the party’s result, not
the individual result. The underlying theory goes back to Hibbs (1977), who
supposed that politicians tend to adopt policies that favor their supporters.
Powell and Whitten (1993) and Swank (1993) have also introduced partisan
eﬀects in the literature on voters’ behavior. Here, our option is to consider
parties’ shares of votes to account for partisan eﬀects. As a consequence, we
will not need to resort to partisan eﬀect dummies, as our dependent variable,
the party’s share of the votes, includes this information. Of course, we do not
ignore the fact that a charismatic incumbent can help her party. Such charisma
is not the explained variable but can be an important one in some contests.
However, we will also capture those personal eﬀects, as we control our estimates
in three diﬀerent ways: ﬁrst, by introducing the party share of votes at the
preceding election (INCPREC); second, by taking into account the link of the
incumbent with the majority in Parliament (PARL, more on this below); third,
by including the potentiality that the incumbent has to merge with competing
candidates (MERG).
More precisely, in link with the two-step electoral process, we deﬁne two
incumbent party shares of the vote: INC1, corresponds to the share of votes
obtained by the incumbent candidate i at the ﬁrst round while INC2 represents
the share of votes received by the incumbent candidate i at the second ballot
when the incumbent has to stand again in the second round.
As explanatory variables, we include political variables relative to the past
and present speciﬁcities of the local election and political variables controlling
for national characteristics. For ﬁrst round estimations, we include the vote
share of the incumbent party in the ﬁrst round of the preceding municipal
elections (INCPREC). In the second round, this variable is replaced by INC1,
the share of votes received by the incumbent in the ﬁrst round. As pointed
out by Dubois and Paty (2009), the previous local vote expresses a long-term
strength or vote inertia, since many voters vote the same way from one election
to the next. This variable may be viewed as a proxy for socio-demographic
7determinants (religious practice, age, occupation...). Another way to deal with
past electoral results is to introduce a dummy DROUND which is equal to one
if the mayor was elected in the ﬁrst round of the preceding election and zero
otherwise. A positive sign is expected on both the party’s share of votes and
on the probability of being reelected, as it indicates that the mayor was easily
elected at the previous election. DUR is a duration variable that is deﬁned as
the logarithm of the number of consecutive mandates spent by the incumbent
as mayor. This variable has an unknown expected sign, since it can be viewed as
a proxy for experience (positive) but also as a measure of weariness (negative).
We will also include the square of this variable (DUR2) in our estimates to
check for non-linearities in the duration phenomenon. The distribution of this
variable is given in table 12.
[Table 1 about here]
If a merger takes place between the two rounds, we give the MERG variable
a value 1, and 0 otherwise. The merger of lists between two rounds should have a
negative impact on the number of votes received by the incumbent, as it signals
that she alone is not in a position to win.
We introduce the number of candidates in each of the corresponding rounds
(NBCAND1 and NBCAND2). All candidates, whose scores in the ﬁrst round
are higher than 10% of the total vote, qualify for the second round. Then,
depending on the results of the ﬁrst round, more than two candidates may be
present in the second round. 40% of the second round races are two-candidate
races, generally between a right-wing and a left-wing candidate whereas in an-
other half (46.5%), a third candidate is present (usually from the far-right party,
the National Front), or even a fourth or a ﬁfth one (in 4 cases over the sample).
[Table 2 about here]
In this case, the winner can receive less than 50% of the votes when the
number of candidates is high in the second round run-oﬀ, as it reduces the share
of the vote for the incumbent. According to Foucault and Fran¸ cois (2005) and
Fauvelle-Aymar and Fran¸ cois (2003), an increase in the number of candidates
leads to a dispersion of votes that penalizes the incumbent. This should be
especially true for the ﬁrst round, hence a negative sign is expected for the
NBCAND1 variable. Conversely, an increase in the number of candidates at
the second round should be favorable to the incumbent, since it lowers the
threshold to be reached for reelection. Hence, a positive sign is expected on the
NBCAND2 variable.
To control for the link with national political trends, we include a dummy
PARL equal to 1 if the incumbent mayor and the majority in Parliament belong
2Due to changes in the electoral rules in 1982 and data availability, we did not take into
account elections before 1977 for computing the DUR variable.
8to the same political party, 0 otherwise3. The main purpose of having included
this variable is to control for the potential inﬂuence exerted by the government’s
popularity in local elections. It has been common for French voters to consider
municipal elections as mid-terms, using them as a way to penalize the President
in charge (negative eﬀect). The variable PRESID is the vote share received by
the incumbent mayor’s party presidential candidate in the second round of the
preceding presidential election4. This variable represents a short-term strength
(Dubois and Paty, 2009). In our sample, the concerned elections are the 1995
and 2008 Presidential elections. The expected sign is positive for this variable.
Indeed, French voters are quite legitimist in the year following a presidential
election, that is, they tend to vote more for the President’s party whichever
election is concerned (positive eﬀect).
4.2 Budgetary and economic variables
As the structure of the budget can be used by politicians to swing elections, a
second data set includes budgetary data at the city level (as in Veiga and Veiga,
2007, or Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2008). Budgetary data is available from
the French Data Census of the Ministry of Finance over the period 2000-2007.
We consider operating expenditures, apart from staﬀ costs (OPER), staﬀ costs
(STAFF) and equipment spending (EQUIP). All these variables are expressed
per capita. Perceived as a manifestation of bad government, operating expen-
ditures excluding staﬀ costs should have a negative impact on the incumbent’s
share of votes. Conversely, equipment spending, as new investments, should
positively impact the dependent variable. The sign of the coeﬃcient on staﬀ
spending is less clear: on the one hand, high staﬀ spending, like other operat-
ing costs, can be interpreted as bad government; on the other hand, more staﬀ
spending can also entail more jobs or higher wages, increasing voters’ welfare
(or simply buying votes). It will deﬁnitely be interesting to identify which of
these two eﬀects dominate empirically.
The third data set includes economic variables. We follow Peltzman’s (1987)
argument about voters considering local economic variables. Peltzman consid-
ered GDP data, while the literature often uses the personal income, an example
that we follow. The model will also account for the unemployment rate. It could
be argued that this variable is rarely signiﬁcant in the literature, which is mainly
based on American elections. In European countries, however, where the unem-
ployment rate is higher and has been high under the period we consider, we
think that this variable should not be dismissed peremptorily. We consider the
gross personal income per capita and annual unemployment rate for each local
authority. For these two variables, we use the gap between municipal value
3Note that centrist UDF-MODEM party belongs to the opposition both in 2001 and in
2008 whereas socialists belongs to the majority in 2001 but not in 2008 (it is the contrary for
UMP).
4If the mayor of municipality i is from the right, we report the result of the right wing
candidate in the municipality at the Presidential election.
9and the average of all other municipalities of the sample (INCOME GAP and
UNEMP GAP). Indeed, it seems sensible to consider that voters will not decide
their vote considering the absolute level of these variables, but rather the size of
the gaps to their national counterparts – or in our context, the averages at the
city level. We expect the coeﬃcients on the gaps to average disposable income
and to average unemployment rate to be positive and negative respectively. Fi-
nally, we introduce the size of the municipal population (POP) as a proxy of the
size of the municipal electorate, precisely to control for size eﬀect. We expect a
positive sign for this variable, as political parties tend to invest more in bigger
strongholds.
[Table 3 about here]
5 Empirical methodology
We study separately the eﬀect of budget structure, economic context and po-
litical variables on the incumbent’s party probability of reelection (see e. g.,
Brender, 2003, in Israel and Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2008, in Brazil) and
vote share (French municipal vote functions have notably been estimated by
Dubois and Paty, 20095). Besides, these studies generally focus on one round
of the considered election, either the ﬁrst or the winning round. In this paper,
our empirical setting is designed to diﬀerentiate between the two rounds of the
French municipal elections.
5.1 The incumbent’s probability of election
First round. The incumbent faces three possibilities in the ﬁrst round of the
election: 1. To receive enough votes (more than 10% of votes) to stand again in
the second ballot (deﬁned as outcome 0); 2. To receive less than 10% of the votes
in the ﬁrst round and not be allowed to compete in the second round (deﬁned as
outcome 1); 3. To have more than 50% of the votes and to be reelected directly
(deﬁned as outcome 2). Table 4 gives the repartition of the three cases for our
sample.
[Table 4 about here]
Therefore, for each incumbent i in year t, a multinomial probit with po-
tential outcome INC1it ∈ (0,1,2) is appropriate. More speciﬁcally, selecting
INC1it = 0 as the natural omitted category (The “stand again” is set as the
5It is also the way adopted by Happy (1992) in Canada, Drazen and Eslava (2009) in
Colombia and Veiga and Veiga (2007) in Portugal.
10reference because it is the more frequent case in our sample (see table 2)), we
associate the following value functions for each outcome:
V0it = 0
V1it = α1iUit + β1iφit + γ1iΩit + ηt + c + 1it
V2it = α2iUit + β2iφit + γ2iΩit + ηt + c + 2it
(1)
where the dependent variable is the result of the ﬁrst round (reelection,
defeat, standing again), Uit is the vector of economic variables, φit is the vector
of political determinants and Ωit includes the budgetary variables. The outcome
corresponds to whichever value function is greatest:
Y = j if Vj = max(V0,V1,V2)
and the likelihood is
Prob(Y = 0) = Prob(V0 > V1,V0 > V2)
Prob(Y = 1) = Prob(V1 > V0,V1 > V2)
Prob(Y = 2) = Prob(V2 > V0,V2 > V1)
(2)
The coeﬃcients are estimated by maximum likelihood procedures. For each
independent variable, the estimated coeﬃcients capture the likelihood of being
reelected or defeated relative to the reference case, which is to stand again.
Speciﬁcation 2 is estimated with year dummies.
The expected signs are obviously diﬀerent according to which outcome one
considers. Regarding the probability of being reelected (outcome 2), we expect
the coeﬃcients on INCOME GAP and UNEMP GAP to be positive and
negative respectively (economic variables Uit). Regarding budgetary variables
(φit), we expect the coeﬃcients on OPER and EQUIP to be negative and pos-
itive respectively; the sign on STAFF has to be empirically settled. Turning
to political variables (Ωit), we expect the coeﬃcient on INCPREC, PRESID
and DROUND to be positive, and on MAJOPARL and NBCAND1 to be
negative; ﬁnally, the signs for coeﬃcients on DUR and DUR2 have to be em-
pirically settled. Regarding the probability of being defeated (outcome 1), the
symmetry with outcome 2 leads us to expect opposite signs for most of the con-
sidered variables. One exception has to be mentioned: the sign on NBCAND1
should indeed be negative in both cases: the higher the number of candidates,
the lower the probability for the incumbent to reach the 50% threshold in the
ﬁrst round.
Second round. We deﬁne the reelection of the incumbent as a discrete
variable which takes the value 1 if the incumbent is reelected and zero otherwise.
Note that in nearly 65% of cases, the incumbent who has to stand again at the
second ballot is reelected. A binary probit is appropriate. Hence, the probability
of reelection of the incumbent in city i against k = 1...n competitors during year
t is:
11Prob(INC2it > Max(COMP21it,...,COMP2nit) =

1 if δiUit + ρiφit + κiΩit + λd + ηt + c + it > Max(COMP21it,...,COMP2nit)
0 otherwise
(3)
where COMP2k=1...n,it is the share of votes of the kth competitor. Once
again, we expect the coeﬃcients on INCOME GAP and UNEMP GAP to
be positive and negative respectively. Regarding budgetary variables (φit), we
still expect the coeﬃcients on OPER and EQUIP to be negative and positive
respectively, while the sign on STAFF has to be empirically settled. Turning
to political variables (Ωit), we expect the coeﬃcient on INC1 (which substi-
tutes to INCPREC), NBCAND2, PRESID, DROUND and MERG to be
positive; the coeﬃcient on PARL is expected to be positive. However, we also
expect diﬀerences of signiﬁcance between the two rounds: some variables may
be important in the ﬁrst round but not in the second.
Econometric Issues. In order to check for potential multicollinearity be-
tween regressors, we compute the Variance Inﬂation Factor (VIF) for each re-
gressor. The VIF shows how the variance of an estimator is inﬂated by the
presence of multicollinearity. The larger the VIF value, the more collinear the
variables will be. A common rule of thumb is to consider a VIF exceeding 10 as
an indication of high collinearity of the considered variable (cf. Gujarati, 2004).
For all our variables, the VIF ranges between 1.06 and 4.326. These results
conﬁrm that our variables do not suﬀer from any multicollinearity problems.
As pointed out by Wooldridge (2002), the issue of unobservable individual
heterogeneity is not easy to tackle in the context of non-linear models. While
the extra orthogonality condition used by the random eﬀects estimator can be
considered in our context as a dubious assumption7, ﬁxed eﬀects cannot be
implemented in the context of the multinomial models that we use for the ﬁrst
round. Since our sample contains only two years, we are left with an insuﬃcient
time variance to include city-level ﬁxed eﬀects in a logit model estimation8.
We decided therefore to estimate speciﬁcations (1) and (3) with pooled probit
functions, speciﬁcation (3) including department dummies λd in order to account
for unobservable heterogeneity at the department level. Besides, we will present
estimates that are run separately on each year. The importance of diﬀerences
between these two sets of estimates will give us valuable information on the
inﬂuence of unobserved heterogeneity. Besides, endogeneity may be a concern
for city-level economic and budgetary variables. Due to the limited degrees of
freedom, we cannot perform any non-linear instrumental variables estimation
6Complete results of VIF tests available upon request.
7Namely, the assumption that the city-speciﬁc intercept is exogenous, or, alternatively,
that the regressors are uncorrelated with the time-invariant city-speciﬁc component of the
error term.
8When an incumbent is reelected on both considered elections, the city’s contribution to
the log-likelihood is zero. This leads us therefore to drop a major part of our sample during
the maximization process.
12for the probit models. Therefore, we use ﬁrst lagged values of right-hand side
variables to address the simultaneity of city-level variables issue.
Finally, the structure of our data confronts us with the problem of the clus-
tering of errors. It is to be expected that observable and unobservable charac-
teristics of the cities are correlated (cf. Moulton, 1986, Moulton, 1990). Here,
in addition to the standard White correction for heteroskedasticity, we correct
for clustering using the Froot correction (Froot, 1989). We therefore correct for
the correlation of errors at the city level.
5.2 The incumbent’s share of votes
First round. For the ﬁrst round, the impact of the set of explanatory variables
detailed before on the incumbent’s share can be estimated through a standard
linear equation, which can be written as follows:
INC1it = αiUit + βiφit + γiΩit + λd + ηt + c + εit (4)
Second round. We estimate a similar equation for the second round if any.
From the ﬁrst equation, we replace the vote share for the incumbent in the ﬁrst
round of the previous municipal elections by the vote share in the ﬁrst round of
the present election. We also introduce the number of candidates in the second
round instead of the number in the ﬁrst round.
INC2it = αiUit + βiφit + γiΩit + λd + ηt + c + εit (5)
For both rounds, we expect the same signs for coeﬃcients than previously.
The potential diﬀerences in terms of size and signiﬁcance between the two sets
of estimates should provide useful insights on which variables are decisive for
being reelected, and which ones help only to win more votes9.
Econometric issues. Due to the lack of time variance and to preserve
comparability with results for the probability of reelection, speciﬁcations (4) and
(5) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares with a full set of department (λd)
and year (ηt) dummies10. We also control for a potential inﬂuence of unobserved
heterogeneity by two diﬀerent means. First, we run separate estimates on 2001
and 2008, as we do for the probability of reelection. Second, we run another
set of estimates on ﬁrst-diﬀerence variables, which is another standard method
to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity. Once again, we use ﬁrst lagged values
9Note that contrary to the estimation of the incumbent party’s probability of reelection,
we will not include the dummy variable MERG in speciﬁcation 5, due to endogeneity con-
cerns. There is indeed an obvious issue of reverse causality on the dependent variable and
MERG: the expected share of votes for the incumbent at the second round clearly impacts
the probability of merging. Without any robust option to instrument this variable, we prefer
to remove it from the incumbent party’s share of votes estimations.
10Similarly to Dubois and Paty (2009), INCPREC is not a lagged dependent variable in
the strict sense. Besides, since we do not include city-level ﬁxed eﬀects, our estimates do not
suﬀer from systematic bias in the lagged dependent variable, which is traditionally solved by
taking a within transformation, and then applying instrumental variables (IV) estimation or
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. Therefore, estimators of the Arellano-
Bond type are not necessary.
13of explanatory variables to address the endogeneity issue. Finally, for the same
motivations presented regarding the probit models for the incumbent reelection,
we correct for clustering at the city level using the Froot (1989) correction.
6 Results
6.1 Econometric evidence: the reelection probability
Results for the reelection probability in the ﬁrst round (equations 1 or 2) are
presented in table 5. Regarding the ﬁrst round, columns (a) to (d) present the
results on the whole sample; columns (a) and (b) report the results from the
basic speciﬁcation without political variables; the latter are added in columns
(c) and (d). Columns (e) to (h) (resp. (i) to (l)) replicate these estimates over
the year 2001 (resp. 2008). We present the estimates for both the probability
of being defeated (P(Y = 1)) and of being reelected (P(Y = 2)) - considering
that the reference case is the “stand again” situation (P(Y = 0)). The reported
coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects computed at means for continuous regressors.
[Table 5 about here]
The estimation results show that high staﬀ costs per capita raise the prob-
ability that the incumbent is reelected in the ﬁrst round, rather than having
to stand again. However, if the incumbent spends more in non-wages operating
expenditures, she reduces her probability of being reelected in the ﬁrst round.
Even if her probability of being reelected is reduced, she would not worry about
being defeated in the ﬁrst round as spending choices have no impact on the
probability of being defeated in the ﬁrst round. These results are in line with
those obtained by Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) for Brazil: mayors who
spend more in capital expenditures during their terms of oﬃce increase the
probability of their own reelection, or of a successor from the same political
party. However in their paper, the impact of current expenditures is not pre-
cisely estimated. One potential explanation is that operating expenditures have
to be disaggregated to distinguish the eﬀect of salaries from the eﬀect of other
operating expenditures, which may appear unnecessary to the electorate. Note
that in our sample, the impact of budgetary variables on the probability of re-
election is signiﬁcant for the whole period and for the 2008 election but not for
the 2001 election. This new importance of budgetary choices on voters’ decisions
is in line with Brender’s (2003) ﬁndings for Israel and Veiga and Veiga’s (2007)
ﬁndings for Portugal. It may result from a shift in voters’ concerns away from
ideological issues to economic ones, leading to voters’ greater sensitivity to the
budget cycle.
Here, as in the above ﬁrst set of estimates, the indicators of relative economic
performance (income and unemployment) appear to have little signiﬁcance. For
14the whole sample, a higher than the national average unemployment rate reduces
the probability of being reelected in the ﬁrst round and increases the probability
of being defeated in the ﬁrst round (compared to the reference case). If the eﬀect
is signiﬁcant at 10% for the whole sample, the eﬀect is more signiﬁcant when
we only study the year 2008. It seems that the budget variables’ impacts dwarf
that of other performance indicators (unemployment and income).
Even if one has to be cautious about the meaning of pseudo-R-quared, one
has to notice that the pseudo R-squared of the estimations increases dramati-
cally when we include the political variables, by a factor of three or four. This
implies that political considerations clearly weigh more in voters’ minds than
economic considerations. To be defeated in the ﬁrst round rather than to stand
again depends on the past electoral results of the mayor and of the incumbent’s
wing at the presidential election. As these two variables are statistically sig-
niﬁcant with the expected sign, there is strong evidence to suggest that the
incumbent party enjoys both short and long-term strength by beneﬁting from
the vote share of parties of similar ideology in preceding national elections. The
lower the incumbent’s vote share at the previous municipal election, the higher
her probability of being defeated in the ﬁrst round when compared to the “stand
again” case. Moreover, where the incumbent belongs to the left (resp.right), her
probability of being defeated in the ﬁrst round will be high (resp low) if the left-
wing candidate made a low (high) score in the municipality at the presidential
election.
Strikingly, the number of competing candidates in the ﬁrst round has a
negative impact, both on the probability of being defeated in the ﬁrst round
and on the probability of being reelected in the ﬁrst round (compared to the
“stand again” case). It conﬁrms a result found by Foucault and Fran¸ cois (2005)
and Fauvelle-Aymar and Fran¸ cois (2003): when there is an increase in the
number of candidates, it leads to a dispersion of votes, which penalizes the
incumbent. Nevertheless, when there are too many candidates, it is reassuring
for the electorate to vote for someone they know, thus preventing the incumbent
from being defeated in the ﬁrst round11.
The impact of the PARL dummy is even more interesting, as its sign is neg-
ative and its signiﬁcance high for the probability of being reelected. This result
adds weight to the view of voters seizing the ﬁrst electoral opportunity to send
a message of discontent to the national majority. Such a message may how-
ever strongly conﬂict with local contexts where the mayor has strong charisma
and/or is of a national caliber.
11One way to test this hypothesis is to introduce both the number of candidates and the
square of the number of candidates, because a non-linear relationship between the number
of candidates and the incumbent party’s share of votes is very likely. A negative sign will be
expected for the ﬁrst variable and a positive sign for the second one (Foucault and Fran¸ cois,
2005).
15[Table 6 about here]
Table 6 presents the pooled probit estimates for the second ballot result (if
any). In this case, the dependent variable is the probability of being reelected.
As in table 5, column (a) gives the results of basic speciﬁcations including only
economic variables while column (b) provides the full speciﬁcation with political
variables. Once again, columns (c)/(d) and (e)/(f) display the results for each
year considered separately.
These results reveal important diﬀerences from the ﬁrst ballot parameters.
First, budgetary variables no longer play a role on the probability of being
reelected. Second, as INC1 and PRESID are statistically signiﬁcant with a
positive eﬀect on the probability of being reelected, this represents strong evi-
dence that the incumbent beneﬁts from vote inertia and partisan waves. This
may indicate that a local incumbent is ﬁrst rewarded for good use of public funds
in the ﬁrst round, but that ideological considerations may dominate during the
second round debate, a result that supports the need for considering the two
rounds separately. Third, in this round, if there are more than two candidates,
it is favorable to the incumbent as it increases her probability of being reelected
(even if it reduces the incumbent party’s share of votes).
As noted above, a particularity in French local elections is that the contest is
multi-partisan (with up to ten parties competing), and that some of the parties
can decide to merge after the ﬁrst round. We also show that the ballot rules
(i.e., the possibility of merging lists between two electoral rounds) count and
increase the probability of being reelected. However this eﬀect is only signiﬁcant
in the 2001 election. Finally, belonging to the majority in Parliament reduces
the probability of being reelected, as in the ﬁrst round.
6.2 Econometric evidence: the incumbent’s party’s share
of votes
Estimation results for equations 4 and 5 are shown in tables 7 and 8 respectively.
Both tables detail the baseline speciﬁcations, establishing if and how voters
react to local economic conditions on the whole sample, before adding political
variables to the picture. More precisely, columns (a) and (b) report the results
from estimating equations 4 and 5 in levels, while columns (c) and (d) show
estimates from the ﬁrst diﬀerentiations of these equations. Lastly, columns (c)
to (h) give yearly estimates to check if the results obtained on the pooled series
for 2001 and 2008 are veriﬁed for each year separately.
[Table 7 about here]
16Regarding the ﬁrst round, estimates based on levels and ﬁrst diﬀerences lead
mostly to the same signs for coeﬃcients. Unsurprisingly, many variables lose
their signiﬁcance from levels to ﬁrst diﬀerences, which is likely to be due to
the loss of information implied by diﬀerentiation. Overall, an important result
emerges from the basic speciﬁcation in column (a): the inﬂuence of operating
and equipment infrastructures on voters’ behavior. Strikingly and importantly,
the sign on the operating expenditures excluding staﬀ costs is negative, but
positive on the equipment spending and salaries12. As we consider the biggest
municipalities, this may not be so surprising, as they beneﬁt from higher levels
of managerial staﬀ and are the location of most decentralized central services,
which can legitimate high staﬀ costs for the voters. Hence, all things considered,
this awareness amongst voters of the budget structure conﬁrms the preceding
results on Portugal and Brazil, for example, but had, to our knowledge, not
been shown for France before. However, the signiﬁcance of budgetary variables
is not obtained for the year 2001.
The inclusion of the local income performance (relative to the sample’s av-
erage) shows no or weak inﬂuence on the incumbent’s party results. This result
contrasts with those generally obtained, notably since Peltzman (1987). More
in line with the literature (see Hibbs, 2006) is the result that unemployment
never inﬂuences voters’ decisions13. Although the two results seem to imply
that voters do not react to economic conditions, it can be said that these are
already implicitly included in the spending variables, given that municipalities’
receipts are sensitive to the business cycles, and that they are in charge of
some welfare transfers. As for the municipal population variable, incumbents
in bigger cities seem to receive higher shares of votes, but this eﬀect is only
highly signiﬁcant when we include political variables in the analysis. Again, one
can think that incumbent parties will invest more in bigger cities and propose
well-known candidates, as it is strategic to maintain the leadership of big cities.
As for political variables, past local elections play roles in the reelection
process: the higher the past vote shares, the higher they will be for the present
election (which conﬁrms the presence of an incumbency premium). Moreover,
if the mayor has been elected in the ﬁrst round in the past, he will receive
more votes at the present election. However, we exhibit a tiredness eﬀect for
mayors running successive mandates: being in oﬃce during many mandates
reduces the vote shares obtained and tends to reduce the incumbency premium.
A quadratic relationship is observed which means that the electorate becomes
attached to people that have been mayors since the end of the 1970s. The number
of competing candidates has a negative impact on the incumbent’s vote share.
It conﬁrms a result found by Foucault and Fran¸ cois (2005) and Fauvelle-Aymar
and Fran¸ cois (2003): when there is an increase in the number of candidates, it
leads to a dispersion of votes that penalizes the incumbent. PRESID and PARL
12Additional results show that the debt level does not inﬂuence voters. One potential
explanation is that municipalities are not highly indebted in France.
13Voters may punish the incumbent party only if it belongs to the majority in Parliament,
because reducing unemployment is a task of the central government.
17variables control for the link with national political trends. The PARL dummy
variable is strongly signiﬁcant and shows up negatively in this speciﬁcation,
adding weight to the view of voters seizing the ﬁrst electoral opportunity to
send a message of discontent to the national majority, whatever its color. Such
a message may however strongly conﬂict with local contexts where the mayor
has strong charisma and/or is of a national caliber.
[Table 8 about here]
Most of the variables that have a signiﬁcant impact on the vote share in the
ﬁrst round lose their signiﬁcance in the second round, especially budgetary vari-
ables. The local incumbent is rewarded or punished for his local management in
the ﬁrst round but in the second, only political factors matter. With a coeﬃcient
of around 0.8, the result of the ﬁrst round explains a high part of the result of
the second round. In the second round, if there are more than two candidates,
the vote-share of the incumbent is reduced. However, it is possible for her to
be reelected with less than 50% of votes. As previously, incumbents in bigger
cities receive more votes, which can be a consequence of parties choices in the
designation of candidates. Finally, belonging to the majority in Parliament does
not guarantee an easy reelection for the incumbent. Voters consider municipal
elections as mid-terms, using them to penalize the majority in Parliament. This
eﬀect shows up here, as the 2008 election stood one year after the presidential
and legislative votes, and signals the end of the honeymoon period. Other stud-
ies on French elections report this eﬀect (see for example Auberger and Dubois,
2005 who analyze reciprocal local-national inﬂuences on legislative elections).
6.3 Robustness checks on the biggest cities
In some departments, there is no municipality with more than 10,000 inhabi-
tants. In order to represent all French departments, we introduced the biggest
cities of each department even if their size was under the threshold. However, it
is interesting to perform the estimations on a sub sample of big cities. Proceed-
ing this way shows whether our results are driven by the smallest municipalities.
Note that our full sample contains 586 municipalities. Dropping municipalities
with less than 10,000 inhabitants only reduces the sample by 21 municipalities.
Results reported in tables 9, 10, 11 and 12 in appendix allow to conclude that
there is no diﬀerence in voters behaviors between the full sample and the sub
sample with municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants. This result val-
idates the choice to introduce the biggest cities of each department when there
is no municipality above the threshold.
Performing estimations on the 211 municipalities with more than 30,000 peo-
ple changes the picture. First, good electoral results in the past do not protect
candidates against being defeated in the ﬁrst round. Moreover,the incumbency
18premium is no longer observed in the estimation of the vote share. Second, bad
spending choices (too high operating expenditures excluding staﬀ costs or too
low equipment spendings) increase the probability of being defeated in the ﬁrst
round. It appears that voters in big municipalities observed the mayor’s choices
more than in other municipalities. We observe that equipment spendings have a
strong impact on the probability of being reelected in the ﬁrst round in munic-
ipalities with less than 30,000 inhabitants whereas the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant
for the whole sample, nor for municipalities with more than 30,000 inhabitants.
Third, in the biggest municipalities, the number of competing candidates in the
ﬁrst round loses its negative impact on the probability of being defeated in the
ﬁrst round (compared to the “stand again” case). Finally, in the second round,
the only diﬀerence between the full sample and the sample with the biggest
municipalities lies in the PRESID variable, which now becomes insigniﬁcant.
7 Conclusion
This paper highlights the link between budget structure and the results of the
2001 and 2008 elections in French municipalities. We ﬁrst show that municipal
budget structure has an impact both on the result of the incumbent’s party
and the probability of reelection, but only in the ﬁrst round. More precisely,
operating expenditures excluding staﬀ costs have a signiﬁcant negative impact
in the ﬁrst round both on the incumbent’s result and on her probability of being
reelected in the ﬁrst round (compared to the ”stand again” case). Equipment
spending plays a positive part on the incumbent party’s share of votes but has
no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of being reelected in the ﬁrst round.
These results conﬁrm those of similar empirical studies in other countries. The
distinction between productive and unproductive expenditures, emphasized by
endogenous macroeconomic models, meets with a response in the voters’ mind.
This latter result conﬁrms the role of “highly visible” expenditures on voters’
behavior emphasized in Veiga and Veiga (2007).
Turning to political grounds, one can notice the interest to carry out this
double study. An interesting result is that the number of competing candidates
in the ﬁrst round both reduces the probability of the incumbent being reelected
in the ﬁrst round, and her probability of being defeated in the ﬁrst round.
A tiredness eﬀect for mayors running successive mandates appears in the ﬁrst
round. The need for a mayor to merge lists with those of other competitors
can increase her chance of being reelected. More strikingly, the fact that the
incumbent belongs to the party that has the majority in Parliament tends to
reduce the incumbent’s share of the vote, and her probability of being reelected
in both rounds. Furthermore, local socio-economic and economic (gap to the
average) variables do not come into play in voter’s minds.
The outcomes of this paper point to several directions for future research.
First, an incumbent’s results are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the number of com-
19peting candidates. This degree of electoral competition may depend on the per-
formance of the mayor during her mandate. The electoral process begins before
elections, starting with the choice of residents for whom to be candidate. Then,
the number of candidates aﬀects the incumbent’s result. As a consequence, this
electoral process could be explained better by using a system of simultaneous
equations. By itself, this research agenda stands as an important one, but it
is probably as important, given how the budget structure weighs in voters’ be-
havior, to have a model taking into account interactions between politicians’
decisions about the budget (in the line of what Dubois et al., 2007, did for
French departments, for example) and their impact on a politician’s prospects
for future election(s).
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22Duration Proportion (in %) Duration Proportion (in %)
1 40.9 4 14.6
2 25.3 5 3.5
3 15.6 6 0.1
Table 1: Number of consecutive mandates spent by the incumbent as a mayor
9 Appendix








> 8 3.6% /
Table 2: Repartition of the number of candidates
Variables Deﬁnition Source Mean StdDev Min Max
OPER Operating costs p.c. Census of the 562.73 197.46 158.00 2129.00
STAFF Staﬀ costs p.c ministry of 0.35 0.07 0.12 0.71
EQUIP equipment spending p.c ﬁnance 0.19 0.07 0.008 0.58
UNEMP GAP Unemployment rate gap INSEE -5.10-8 0.30 -0.67 1.28
INCOME GAP Gross personal income gap INSEE -2.10-8 0.34 -0.59 3.69
POP population of the municipality INSEE 35761 39958 4239 437715
INC1 incumbent party’s share Ministry of 49.90 13.60 8.20 100.00
of votes 1st round internal aﬀairs
INC2 incumbent party’s share 47.31 8.43 13.65 100.00
of votes, second round if any
INCPREC mayor’s share of votes, 53.61 9.03 22.98 100.00
previous election
NBCAND1 # candidates, ﬁrst round 3.93 1.66 1.00 11.00
NBCAND2 # candidates, second round 2.72 0.69 2.00 5.00
PRESID incumbent party’s share 54.5 7.10 32.50 86.80
of votes, presidential election
DUR # consecutive mandates 2.10 1.20 1.00 6.00




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25Table 6: Second round, Incumbent party’s probability of being reelected
Dep. Var P(INC2it > Max(COMP21it,...,COMP2nit)
Full Sample Y ear : 2001 Y ear : 2008
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
OPER 0.0760 0.0681 0.0869 0.0604 0.1131 0.1858
(0.1395) (0.1462) (0.1210) (0.1326) (0.1618) (0.1883)
STAFF -0.2279 -0.2044 -0.1519 -0.0689 0.0316 -0.0520
(0.1430) (0.1454) (0.1450) (0.1620) (0.1328) (0.1550)
EQUIP -0.0093 -0.0119 -0.0314 0.0300 -0.0315 -0.0744
(0.0611) (0.0632) (0.0623) (0.0674) (0.0705) (0.0719)
INCOME GAP -0.0315 -0.0664
b 0.0230 -0.0149 -0.0406 -0.0671
c
(0.0286) (0.0287) (0.0417) (0.0474) (0.0428) (0.0404)
UNEMP GAP -0.0031 -0.0048 -0.0061 -0.0034 -0.0227 -0.0171






























DUR 0.1248 0.1833 -0.0211
(0.1141) (0.1564) (0.1349)
DUR









Observations 502 493 304 303 258 250
Estimation Probit Probit Probit
Pseudo-R
2 0.1954 0.3413 0.2093 0.4341 0.1858 0.2860
Note: Marginal eﬀects computed at means. Robust errors into parentheses. Estimates re-
ported on columns (a) and (b) include department and year dummies. Signiﬁcance levels:





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 10: Robustness 1b: Second round, Incumbent party’s probability of being
reelected
Dep. Var P(INC2it > Max(COMP21it,...,COMP2nit)
More than 10,000 inhab. Less than 30,000 inhab. More than 30,000 inhab.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
OPER 0.1243 0.1078 0.1770 0.1391 0.0204 0.1431
(0.0950) (0.1014) (0.1285) (0.1354) (0.1425) (0.1451)
STAFF -0.0905 -0.0626 -0.1596 -0.0718 -0.0310 -0.1641
(0.0955) (0.1005) (0.1295) (0.1404) (0.1543) (0.1538)
EQUIP -0.0581 -0.0178 0.0216 0.0570 -0.1178
c -0.0470
(0.0464) (0.0480) (0.0583) (0.0660) (0.0668) (0.0654)
INCOME GAP -0.0176 -0.0387 0.3710
c 0.1487 0.0178 0.0004
(0.0293) (0.0243) (0.1957) (0.2310) (0.0410) (0.0332)
UNEMP GAP -0.0137 -0.0097 -0.0099 -0.0137 0.0028 0.0111
(0.0085) (0.0092) (0.0133) (0.0153) (0.0146) (0.0144)
POP 0.1035
c 0.1990
a -0.0700 0.1614 -0.0243 0.0640























DUR 0.1097 0.1418 0.0624
(0.0944) (0.1344) (0.1263)
DUR
2 -0.0164 -0.0246 -0.0025
(0.0180) (0.0258) (0.0236)







Observations 559 555 333 324 238 238
Estimation Probit Probit Probit
Pseudo-R
2 0.1838 0.3355 0.2174 0.3417 0.1643 0.3693
Note: Marginal eﬀects computed at means. Robust errors into parentheses. Estimates include
department and year dummies. Signiﬁcance levels: c10%, b5%, a1%. Intercept not reported.
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